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The IEC 61511 standard requires a verification calculation that a proposed design for a safety 
instrumented function (SIF) achieves the desired safety integrity level (SIL). The evaluation of 
the safety integrity level of a new or existing safety instrumented system requires detailed 
calculations based on the failure rates of the device and the planned maintenance/testing cycle 
for the system.  The failure rates of the devices are often taken from standard failure rate 
tabulations of equipment.  The maintenance and testing plans are developed based on plant 
experience.  All of the data used in the SIL calculations are uncertain.  This paper develops a 
general method for uncertainty analysis of the SIL calculations.  The general method is based on 
the application of probability theory - variance contribution analysis (VCA) – to the equations 
presented in ISA TR 84.00.02-2115.    An example is worked to demonstrate the methodology.  
 
Background 
The calculation of the probability of failure on demand (PFD) is a common engineering task 
when designing an interlock or safety system that is to be in compliance with IEC 61511  
[Ref. 1].  The calculation of the PFD is often done using approximate equations defined in the 
ISA TR84.00.02 technical report [Ref. 2].  The simplified equation method in the ISA report is 
commonly used and is based on the use of reliability block diagrams where the field sensors, 
Safety Instrumented System (SIS) logic solver and final control elements are considered 
independent of each other in the sense of not sharing common devices or systems.  The PFD is 
then calculated using the failure rates of the devices, planned test intervals, vendor supplied 
  
estimates on diagnostic coverage of the devices and an allowance for the potential for common 
cause failures.  Almost all of these parameters are uncertain.  The failure rate data is often taken 
from generic data sources which show wide ranges in the observed values.   
 
Because of the uncertainty in the parameters, the design engineer makes allowances in the design 
by the use of safety factors or rules of thumb to improve the chances that the final interlock 
installation will work as intended.  Since each engineer has a different set of safety factors and 
rules of thumb, two designs may differ significantly in the way a hazard is controlled. 
 
A more formal method for handling the underlying uncertainty in the calculation of the PFD of 
an interlock is needed.  Previously, Freeman and Summers [Ref. 3] published an uncertainity 
analysis of the PFD of an interlock.  Two different methods were used in this analysis: 
 Monte Carlo Simulation 
 Variance Contribution Analysis (VCA) 
 
Monte Carlo Simulation requires that the engineer build a model of the interlock using 
specialized computer software.  The use of  VCA requires that the sensitivity of the interlock 
model be determined either by numerical methods or by direct analytical calculations.  The 
Freeman paper demonstrates that VCA can be used for the uncertainty analysis.  However, the 
paper does not present a complete analysis method that can be applied to any system defined in 
the ISA technical report TR84.00.02.  The goal of this paper is to develop a general set of 
analytical equations that will allow VCA to be used in uncertainty analysis of any interlock 
developed per the IEC 61511 standard. 
 
Review of Interlock Design 
The IEC standard looks at an interlock as a series of three major components (see Figure 1).  
First is the sensor set which sends an indication of an abnormal event to a logic solver.  The logic 
solver determines is the signal from the sensor meets the conditions required to activate (trip) the 
interlock.  If the interlock is to be activated, a signal is sent to the final control elements to take 
action (stop flow, close valve, etc) to prevent a process safety event from occurring.   
Based on the devices selected the design engineer then evaluates whether the proposed interlock 
design meets the design criterion for probability of failure on demand.  Typically, the design 
engineer is given the target PFD as a statement such as “provide a SIL-2 interlock to stop flow 
on high level in a vessel.”  A SIL-2 interlock requires a PFD of at most 0.01 or a risk reduction 
factor of at least 100.  The needed risk reduction is often determined in a Layer of Protection 
Analysis (LOPA) [ Ref. 4] and represents the managements decision on how risk is to be 
managed in a system.  The resulting SIL-2 interlock design must have a high likelihood of 
achieving the target risk reduction as the LOPA team may be relying on it to be part of an overall 




The ISA technical report (TR 84.00.02) [Ref. 2] provides shortcut methods for the evaluation of 
the PFD of an interlock design.  Tables 1 and 2 are taken from the ISA technical report [Ref. 2].  
Typical parameters need to compute the PFD include: 
 DC is the diagnostic coverage;  
 DI is the diagnostic interval;  
 TI is the proof test interval,  
 λD is the dangerous failure rate;  
 MTTR is the mean time to restore the system to operation 
   is the common cause failure parameter that is always is between 0 and 1 
In practice most if not all of these parameters are uncertain.  Using parameter values obtained 
from plant records, vendor data or generic data bases the design engineer proceeds to develop the 
model for the interlock.   
 
What is needed is a means to rapidly evaluate the impact of parameter uncertainty on the 
interlock PFD. The remainder of this paper applies the methods of variance contribution analysis 
(VCA) to determine the mean (expected value) and the standard deviation of the interlock PFD 






Table 1. Simplified PFDavgformulas for Non-Repairable System  
without considering CCF, Diagnostics or MTTR. 
Configuration Function 
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Table 2. Simplified PFDavg Formulas for Repairable System  
considering CCF, Diagnostics and MTTR 
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Table 2. Simplified PFDavg Formulas for Repairable System  
considering CCF, Diagnostics and MTTR 



























































































Review of Variance Contribution Analysis (VCA) Methodology 
The mean and variance of a function of random variables can be approximated using the method 
described by Haugen [Ref. 5] and applied by Freeman [Ref. 3, 6, 7].  Define an arbitrary function 




Y = F(xi)  (Eq 1) 
 
The mean of Y can be estimated using the following approximation:  
 
 
E(Y) = F[ E(xi)] (Eq 2) 
 
Where:  
E(Y) = expected value of random variable Y = mean of Y 
E(xi) = expected value of random variable xi = mean of xi 
 
The variance of Y can likewise be estimated as: 
 
V(Y) =  (Eq 3) 
 
Where: 
V(Y) = variance of random variable Y as defined above in Equation 1 
V(xi) = variance of random variable xi  as defined above in Equation 1 
 
Note that the variance is simply the square of the standard deviation.  Using the variance will 
simplify the mathematics that is described below.  The contribution of each independent random 
variable to the overall variance in the function is: 
 
V(Y from xi) =  (Eq 4) 
 
The relative contribution of each term to the overall variance V(Y) is a measure of the 
importance in the uncertainty in the particular random variable, xi.  In effect, this is a sensitivity 










































sensitivity in the answer to changes in the uncertain random variable, xi, with a measure of the 
uncertainty in the random variable, xi. The overall variance in Y is found by summing the 
sensitivity weighted variances from each random variable. 
 
Recommended Interlock PFD Uncertainty Analysis Method 
Previously, Freeman and Summers [Ref. 3] suggested a framework for the inclusion of 
uncertainty analysis in the calculations completed for a new interlock per the ISA TR [Ref. 2].  
The following uncertainty analysis method has been expanded to incorporate critical decisions 
that the process management must make in the design process. 
 
1. Complete the interlock design using the methods outlined in IEC 61511 [Ref. 1].  
 
2. Review with the process system management and determine if the proposed interlock 
should be considered repairable or non-repairable.  A simple flow chart for this decision 
making is presented in Figure 2.  The basic question is: “can the interlock be repaired 
safely while the process operates.”  This is a management question and management 
should be the one that decides the answer to this important question. 
 
3. Create interlock performance equation as the mathematical model for the combination of 
sensor, logic solver and final control elements using the methods outlined in ISA 
technical report (TR84.00.02) [Ref. 2].  For non-repairable systems, Table 3 can be used. 
For more complex systems such as non-repairable redundant systems with the potential 
for common cause failures, use the repairable equations of Table 4 and set DI, DC, and 
MTTR all equal to zero.  For systems where common cause failures (DCF), Diagnostics 






Table 3.  Roadmap for Mean and Variance of Non-Repairable System  




Mean PFD Using  
Appendix A Equation 
PFD Variance Using  
Appendix A Equation 
1oo1 F1 = A-9 A-18 
1oo2 F2 = A- 10 A- 19 
1oo3 F3 = A-11 A-20 
2oo2 F4 = A-12 A-21 
2oo3 F5 = A-13 A-22 




Table 4.  Roadmap for Mean and Variance of Repairable System  




Mean PFD Using  
Appendix A Equation 
PFD Variance Using  
Appendix A Equation 
1oo1 F7 = A-30 A-44 
1oo2 F8 = A- 31 A- 86 
1oo3 F9 = A-32 A-94 
2oo2 F10 = A-33 A-48 
2oo3 F11 = A-34 A-102 
3oo3 F12 = A-35 A-50 
  
Note that in all of the calculations indicated by the equations referenced in Table 4, the expected 




4. Define the uncertainty in the parameters and variables of the interlock model specified in 
step 2.  The uncertainty can be given as the upper and lower range of the possible values 
(uniform probability distribution), as the upper, lower and recommended values 
(triangular distribution), or as a mean and standard deviation (normal distribution).  See 
the example above for guidance in the evaluation of safety instrumented system 
interlocks. 
 
5. Compute the expected value of each variable in the interlock performance equation.  The 
equations for the mean and variance for the uniform, triangular and normal probability 
distributions are presented for various probability distributions in Vose [Ref. 8].  The 
example interlock calculations used a triangular distribution to represent the uncertainty 
in the parameters. 
 
6. Compute the expected value or mean of the interlock PFD using the mean value of each 
of the variables in Step 5.  See Tables 4 and 5 for recommended equations. 
 
7. Compute the sensitivity of the result from the interlock performance equation by use of 
the partial derivative of the basic interlock performance equation with respect to each of 
the variables as presented in Appendix A. 
 
8. Compute the variance of the interlock performance equation PFD by use of the variance 
contribution using equations from Tables 3 or 4.  This entails multiplying the variance of 
each of the uncertain variables in the basic interlock performance equation by the square 
of its sensitivity (obtained in step 7), as evaluated at the variable mean.  Sum the resulting 
terms to obtain the overall variance of the PFD in the interlock performance equation.  
See Tables 4 and 5 for recommended equations. 
 
9. Determine the level of risk that the owner/operator wishes to take that the final interlock 
will not work.  Note that this is a management decision not an instrument engineer 
decision!  In this paper, the 95% level of risk reduction has been used: 
 5% chance of failure or a 95% chance of the interlock achieving the desired risk 
reduction 
 
10. Assuming that the interlock owner operator wishes to take a low risk (5%) of the 
interlock failing to achieve its design target PFD, compute the 95% upper confidence 
limit on the computed PFD by use of the standard normal factor, Z, [Ref. 9] as: 
 
  
Z =  [
𝑥𝑖−𝐸(𝑥)
𝜎
]             (Eq 5) 
 
Where: 
σ     =  standard deviation of the PFD of the interlock of interest from the interlock 
performance equation obtained from step 7.  Note that the variance of a random 
variable is the square of the standard deviation of the random variable. 
E(x) = the expected value of the PFD of the interlock of interest from the interlock 
performance equation obtained from step 5 
 
 For the 95% upper limit, Z = 1.645.  Rearranging Eq. 5 allows for the direct 
calculation of the corresponding value of the 95% upper confidence limit on the 
PFD as: 
 
X95% = 1.645 σ + E(x)  (Eq 6) 
 
 Where:   
 X95% = the upper 95% limit on the computed PFD of the interlock of interest 
from the interlock performance equation. 
 
Compare the 95% upper confidence limit on the PFD of the interlock of concern with that 
established as the desired PFD for risk reduction.  If the 95% confidence of the RRF is greater 
than the desired RRF, the design is complete.  If not, revise the design or change inspection test 
intervals to achieve the desired RRF.  If it is not possible to achieve the desired target RRF 
economically, revisit the LOPA study accordingly to incorporate better information obtained in 
the uncertainty analysis.  Improve the integrity of the LOPA IPLs or identify additional IPLs to 
drive the risk to a tolerable level.  Continue this process until the computed RRFs are greater 
than the desired RRFs for risk reduction and risk management. 
  
Example Interlock Problem 
Previously, Freeman and Summers [Ref. 3] published an example in the use of VCA to 
determine the likelihood that the interlock would provide the risk reduction desired by the 
management and the LOPA team.  The process system is shown in Figure 3.  The process uses a 
compressor to increase the pressure of a process stream prior to additional processing.  The gas 
being compressed is toxic and flammable.  Of concern is a slug of liquid being sent to the 
compressor.  If a liquid slug is sent to the compressor, significant damage to the compressor is 
expected with probable seal damage and a subsequent release of flammable and toxic material 
into the work area.  A large fire and/or explosion could result if the release were to be ignited.  If 
the release is not ignited, the nearby workers could be exposed to the toxic gas resulting in death 
or injury.  A Layer of Protection Analysis (LOPA) review of this system has been completed.  
  
Among several recommendations, the LOPA team recommended the installation of a SIL-2 high 
level interlock in the Compressor Knock Out Drum to stop the compressor prior to liquids 
entering the system. 
Figure 1 shows a simplified diagram for the interlock.  Three level sensors are provided in the 
Compressor Knock Out Drum.  The SIS logic solver will use 2oo3 voting to detect high level in 
the Compressor Knock Out Drum.  The SIS logic solver will also monitor the difference in level 
signal from each of the three level sensors and will activate an alarm if the deviation is excessive.  
Two independent methods of stopping the compressor are provided.  The SIS will directly signal 
the motor controller on the compressor to stop.  In addition, the SIS logic solver will also signal 
two additional relays to open the power supply to the compressor motor.  These two different 
shutdown will both be activated in the event of high level in the Compressor Knock Out Drum.  
Either one of the two shutdowns is capable of stopping the compressor by turning off the electric 
power supply to the motor. 
  
Models 
The first step in the calculation of the “goodness” of an interlock is to establish the model to be 
used in the calculations.  Note that the sensors are 2oo3 voting and the final control elements are 
each 1oo1.  Appendix A presents the equations for various models that can be used for 
describing this system. 
 
The overall probability of failure on demand (PFD) of the interlock is given as: 
 
PFD = PFDs + PFDsis + PFDfce (Eq 7) 
 
Where: 
PFD = Probability of failure on demand of the interlock as a whole 
PFDs =  Probability of failure on demand of the sensors (voting as 2oo3) 
PFDsis =  Probability of failure on demand of the SIS logic solver 
PFDfce =  Probability of failure on demand of the final control elements.   
 
Since there are two final control elements arranged in series, the PFDfce = sum of the PFDs of 
the final control elements (Relay PFD and MCC PFD).  
 




PFDr  = Probability of failure on demand of the two relays voting as 1oo2 to shutdown gas 
compressor.  
PFDmcc = Probability of failure on demand of the MCC to shutdown the gas compressor 
 
 
For this example, the following selections are made to model the performance of the interlock. 
 
Model for Sensors (2oo3) 
The sensors are considered repairable as one sensor can be replaced while the other two function 
and provide continuous functionality of the interlock.  There are three sensors that will be used in 












































  (Eq 9) 
 
Where: 
PFDsavg is the average probability of failure on demand of the sensors 
DCs is the diagnostic coverage for sensor failure  
DIs is the diagnostic interval for the sensors 
MTTRs is the mean time to restore the sensors to functionality given a sensor failure 
TIs is the test interval for the sensors 
βs is the common cause failure parameter 
λDs is the failure rate to a dangerous condition for the sensors 
MTTR is the mean time to restore the system from the time that failure occurs 
 
Model for SIS Logic Solver 
Use a fixed probability of failure on demand as specified by the vendor.  Unless detailed design 
information is provided by the SIS logic solver vendor, this will be the normal default condition 




Model for Final Control Elements 
There are two separate paths to shutdown the gas compressor.  First is by the SIS logic solver 
commanding the MCC to shutdown power to the the gas compressor motor.  The second is for 
the SIS logic solver to issue a shutdown command to two interposing relays (R1 and R2) which 
will cause the power to the gas compressor motor to stop.  Two different models are needed to 
the final control elements.  These two subsystems are considered non-repairable in this analysis, 
 
Model for Interposing Relays (1oo2)  
There are two interposing relays (R1 and R2 in the interlock).  From Appendix A, use Equation 
























  (Eq 10) 
Where: 
PFDravg is the average probability of failure on demand of the relays voting 1oo2 to shutoff the 
gas compressor. 
TIr is the test interval for the relays 
βr  is the common cause failure parameter 





Model for MCC (1oo1)  





   (Eq 11) 
 
Where: 
PFDmccavg is the average probability of failure on demand of the MCC to shutoff the gas 
compressor. 
TImcc is the test interval for the MCC 
λDmccis the failure rate to a dangerous condition for the MCC 
 
Data 
The calculation of the PFD of the interlock requires a set of data to be used to represent the 
system.  Tables 5, 6, and 7 are taken from the Freeman-Summers paper [Ref. 3] and presents the 
data used to represent the interlock system.  Note that these data were originally taken from 
generic data sources and do not represent any particular device or system. 
 
Table 5.  Uncertainty Data for Level Sensors Used in Example Interlock 
(All variable probability distributions assumed to be triangularly distributed) 
Variable Min Mode Max Mean Variance 
λDs- Fail Dangerous 
Rate 
2.84x10-3 Yr-1 5x10-3 Yr-1 8.5x10-3 Yr-1 5.45x10-3 Yr-1 1.36x10-6 Yr-1 
DCs – Diagnostic 
Coverage * 
0.8 0.9 0.99 0.897 1.51x10-3 
DIs – Diagnostic 
Interval ** 
5.71x10-5 5.71x10-5 5.71x10-5 5.71x10-5 0 
TIs – Test Interval 4 Yr 5 Yr 6 Yr 5 Yr 5.56x10-2 Yr2 
βs- Common Cause 
Failure Fraction * 
0 0.02 0.1 0.04 4.67x10-4 
MTTRs - Mean Time to 
Restore *** 
1.37x10-3 Yr 8.22x10-3 Yr 1.92x10-2 Yr 9.59x10-3 Yr 1.34x10-5 Yr2 
* Unit less 
** 0.5 hours, assumed to be deterministic 




Table 6.  Uncertainty Data for Relays Used in Example Interlock 
(All variable probability distributions assumed to be triangularly distributed) 
Variable Min Mode Max Mean Variance 
λDr- Fail Dangerous Rate 8.76x10-9 Yr-1 2.00x10-3 Yr-1 4.73x10-2 Yr-1 1.64x10-2 Yr-1 1.19x10-4 Yr-2 
DCr – Diagnostic 
Coverage * 
NA NA NA NA NA 
DIr – Diagnostic 
Interval* 
NA NA NA NA NA 
TIr – Test Interval 1 Yr 1 Yr 2 Yr 1.33 Yr 0.056 Yr2 
βr- Common Cause 
Failure Fraction 
0 0.02 0.1 0.04 4.67x10-4 
MTTRr - Mean Time to 
Restore* 
NA NA NA NA NA 
* Not used in relay model 
 
 
Table 7.  Uncertainty Data for MCC Used in Example Interlock 
(All variable probability distributions assumed to be triangularly distributed) 
Variable Min Mode Max Mean Variance 
λDr- Fail Dangerous Rate 1.74x10-4 Yr-1 1.31x10-3 Yr-1 3.00x10-2 Yr-1 1.05x10-2 Yr-1 4.76x10-5 Yr-2 
DCr – Diagnostic 
Coverage* 
NA NA NA NA NA 
DIr – Diagnostic 
Interval* 
NA NA NA NA NA 
TIr – Test Interval 1 Yr 1 Yr 2 Yr 1.33 Yr 5.6x10-2 Yr2 
βr- Common Cause 
Failure Fraction* 
NA NA NA NA NA 
MTTRr - Mean Time to 
Restore* 
NA NA NA NA NA 





Uncertainty Analysis Results 
Using the VCA method to estimate the PFD of the interlock design yields the results shown in 
Table 8. 
 
Table 8.  Results of VCA on Example Interlock Design 
Subsystem Mean PFD Variance of PFD 
Sensors 6.41E-5 1.7657E-9 
Logic Solver 1.34E-4 0 
Relays 5.46E-4 2.0333E-7 
MCC 6.98E-3 4.52E-5 
Totals 7.73E-3 4.54E-5 
Note:  Calculations are carried to an adequate number of places to allow for the resulting PFD to 
be determined.  Rounding to significant number of figures is done at the end. 
 
The mean PFD of 0.00773 implies a mean risk reduction factor of: 
RRF = 1/PFD = 1/0.00773 = 129 (Eq 11) 
 
The variance of 4.54E-5 implies a standard deviation in the PFD of  
Std Dev = (Variance)1/2  = 0.006737 (Eq 12) 
 
The corresponding 95% level of confidence in the PFD: 
X95% = 1.645 std Dev + Mean PFD  (Eq 13) 
 
X95% = 1.645 (0.006737) + 0.00773= 0.01881 (Eq 14) 
 
The RRF for 95% certain PFD is  
RRF95% = 1/0.01881 => 53 (Eq 15) 
 
This is essentially the same result previously reported by Freeman and Summers [Ref. 3] using 
either Monte Carlo Simulation or numerical approximation methods for the VCA sensitivities.  
The calculated  PFD at the 95% level of 0.01881 indicates that there is only a 5% chance that the 
interlock will provide an RRF worse that 53.  Since this level is only SIL-1 capable and not  
  
SIL-2 capable as desired by management, a revised design will be needed to achieve the desired 
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Figure 2.  Decision Tree for Determination 























Relays R1 and R2 Vote 
1oo2 to activate MCC
Level Transmitters LT-1, 
LT-2 and LT-3 Vote 2oo3 















For systems that are considered non-repairable, the simplified equations of Table A.1 
(taken from the ISA Technical Report [Ref. 2]) are used for the analysis. 
 
Table A.1 Simplified PFDavgformulas for Non-Repairable System  
without considering CCF, Diagnostics or MTTR. 
Configuration Function 
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The expected value of the probability of failure on demand is found by calculating the 
PFD using the expected value (mean) of the random variables.   
Let y a function of some random variables, xi, as: 
y = F(xi)  (Eq A-7) 
The mean of y can be estimated using the following approximation:  
E(y) = F[E(xi)] (Eq A-8) 
Where: 
E(y) = expected value of random variable y = mean of y 
E(xi) = expected value of random variable xi = mean of xi 
For the configurations defined in Table A.1, the corresponding expected PFD are presented 
in Table A.2. 
Table A.2 Expected Value of PFDavgformulas for Non-Repairable System  
without considering CCF, Diagnostics or MTTR. 
Configuration Function 
Expected PFD based on "Average 
before" failure rate 
Equation 
Number 
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Where E(x) is the expected value of random variable x. 
  
 
The variance of the PFD is found by taking the weighted sum of the variance of the random 
variables.  The weighting function is the sensitivity of the PFD with respect to random variable.  
In mathematical terms the variance of a function may be found in terms of the variance of the 
random variables as: 
Once again let 
y = F(xi)   (Eq A-15) 








𝑉(𝑥𝑖)   (Eq A-16) 
 
Where: 
V(y) = variance of random variable y as defined above 
V(xi) = variance of random variable xi  as defined above 
The sensitivity of y with respect to a random variable 𝑥𝑖 is:  
Sensitivity of y with respect to 𝑥𝑖 = [
𝜕𝑦
𝜕𝑥𝑖
]  (Eq A-17) 
 
For the configurations defined in Table A.1, the corresponding variance of the PFD are 





Table A.3 Variance of PFDavgformulas for Non-Repairable System  
without considering CCF, Diagnostics or MTTR. 
Configuration Function 
Variance in Function F i based on 
"Average before" failure rate 
Equation 
Number 
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Note that for the calculation of the variance functions, V(Fi), the random variables are evaluated 





For systems that are considered repairable, the simplified equations of Table A.4 are used 
for the analysis.  The expected value of the probability of failure on demand (PFD) is found 
by substituting the expected value of each of the random variables into the corresponding 
equation.  The expected value of the PFD for each of the system configurations is presented 
in Table A.5 
  
  
Table A.4 Simplified PFDavg Formulas for Repairable System  
considering CCF, Diagnostics and MTTR 
Configuratio
n 
Function PFD based on "Average before" failure rate 
Equation 
Number 
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Table A.4 Simplified PFDavg Formulas for Repairable System  
considering CCF, Diagnostics and MTTR 
Configuratio
n 
Function PFD based on "Average before" failure rate 
Equation 
Number 
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Where: 
DC is the diagnostic coverage;  
DI is the diagnostic interval;  
TI is the proof test interval,  
λD is the dangerous failure rate;  
MTTR is the mean time to restore the system to operation 




Table A.5 Expected PFD Formulas for Repairable System  
considering CCF, Diagnostics and MTTR 
Configuratio
n 
Function PFD based on "Average before" failure rate 
Equation 
Number 





























































































































































































Table A.5 Expected PFD Formulas for Repairable System  
considering CCF, Diagnostics and MTTR 
Configuratio
n 
Function PFD based on "Average before" failure rate 
Equation 
Number 





































































































































































The variance of the PFD of the repairable systems is found in the same manner as that in the 
non-repairable cases.  Once again let: 
y = F(xi)   (Eq A-36) 








𝑉(𝑥𝑖)   (Eq A-37) 
 
Where: 
V(y) = variance of random variable y as defined above 
V(xi) = variance of random variable xi  as defined above 
The sensitivity of y with respect to a random variable 𝑥𝑖 is:  
In the case of the repairable systems, there are several more potentially uncertain or random 
variables: 
 DC is the diagnostic coverage;  
 DI is the diagnostic interval;  
 TI is the proof test interval,  
 λD is the dangerous failure rate;  
 MTTR is the mean time to restore the system to operation 
   is the common cause failure parameter that is always is between 0 and 1 
We must evaluate the partial derivative of the PFD function with respect to each and then 
combine them using equation A-37.  The partial derivatives of function F7 with respect to each 

























 7  = 
2
)1( DDC 





 7  = 
2
DDC 




 7  = D  (Eq A-42) 
We can now compute the variance of function F7 as: 






𝑉(𝑥𝑖)   (Eq A-43) 














































  DDC 
(DI) +  2D  V(MTTR) (Eq A-44) 
Equation 44 represents the variance of the probability of failure on demand of the 1001 
configuration when the system is repairable.  We note the following relationships between the 
1001, 2oo2 and 3oo3 configurations: 
F10 = 2 F7  (Eq A-45) 
F12 = 3 F7  (Eq A-46) 
 
We can directly determine the variance of functions F10 and F12 from the properties of the 
variance operator, V(X). 
V(F10 )= V( 2 F7)  (Eq A-47) 
V(F10 )= 4 V(F7)  (Eq A-48) 
V(F12) = V(3 F7)  (Eq A-49) 
V(F12) = 9 V(F7)  (Eq A-50) 
 
The determination of the variance of functions F8, F10, and F11 is done in a similar manner.  To 
simplify the presentation of the derivation of variance of functions F8, F10, and F11, we introduce 



















































 (Eq A-52) 
We note the following relationships: 
F8 = H2 + Q (Eq A-53) 
F9 = H3 + Q (Eq A-54) 
F11 = 3 H2 + Q (Eq A-55) 
The variance of F8, F9 and F11 are found as: 
V(F8 ) = V(H2 + Q)  (Eq A-56) 
V(F9 ) = V(H3 + Q)  (Eq A-57) 
V(F11)= V(3 H2 + Q)  (Eq A-58) 
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x












 9  = 
x











 11  = 
x







 (Eq A-61) 


































We now evaluate the derivatives of function H with respect to each potential random variables: 
 DC is the diagnostic coverage;  
 DI is the diagnostic interval;  
 TI is the proof test interval,  
 λD is the dangerous failure rate;  
 MTTR is the mean time to restore the system to operation 




 =  
2










)1()1( DDC  































 (Eq A-67) 
MTTR
 H)(







































)1( DDC  
 (Eq A-70) 
 
In a similar manner we evaluate the partial derivatives of function Q with respect to each 





















 (Eq A-71) 
 DC is the diagnostic coverage;  
 DI is the diagnostic interval;  
 TI is the proof test interval,  
 λD is the dangerous failure rate;  
 MTTR is the mean time to restore the system to operation 
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 (Eq A-74) 
MTTR
 Q)(


























 (Eq A-77) 
We can now determine the sensitivity of the functions F8, F9 , F11 to the random variables of 











 (Eq A-78) 
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  (Eq A-85) 
 
 
Using the sensitivities for F8 calculated above, the variance in F8 due to uncertain or random 
variables is found as: 
 

















































































V(DI)  (Eq A-86) 
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  (Eq A-93) 
 
 
Using the sensitivities for 9F  calculated above, the variance in 9F due to uncertain or random 
variables is found as: 
 

















































































V(DI)  (Eq A-94) 
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 (Eq A-101) 
 
 
Using the sensitivities for 11F  calculated above, the variance in 11F  due to uncertain or random 
variables is found as: 
 
  





















































































PROCEDURE FOR DETERMINATION OF VARIANCE FOR REPAIRABLE  
1oo2, 1oo3 AND 2oo3 SYSTEMS 
Based on the above derivations we may now write the formulas for the variance of various 
configurations of repairable equipment. 
Step 1. Determine the configuration of equipment to be studied. 
Step 2. Evaluate Function H using the expected value of all random or uncertain variables, 
equation A-51 
Step 3. Evaluate Function Q using the expected value of all random or uncertain variables, 
equation A-52 
Step 4. Evaluate the sensitivity of function H with respect to the random variables using 
equations A-65 thru A-70. 
Step 5. Evaluate the sensitivity of function Q with respect to the random variables using 
equations A-72 thru A-77. 
Step 6. Evaluate the variance as: 
a. For 1oo2 systems use equation A-86 for V(F8) 
b. For 1oo3 systems use equation A-94 for V(F9) 
c. For 2oo3 systems use equation A-102 for V(F11) 
 
 
The end result of the above calculations is the determination of the mean and variance of the 
configuration used in the sensor, logic solver or final control element systems.  Table A.6 
presents a cross reference roadmap for the determination of the mean and variance of various of 
the probability of failure on demand (PFD) of various hardware configurations. The mean and 
variance for the particular configuration is then returned to the overall calculations of the PFD of 
the interlock. 
 
